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Summary 
 
Parliamentary election outcomes have recently shifted significantly in some small open 
economies with high living standards. As regional differences widened, this study goes down 
to the regional level and investigates whether or not regional factors have been driving the 
election outcomes. An econometric model is designed explaining the election outcomes of the 
left-wing, middle and right-wing parties per municipality by latent variables at the country 
and regional levels. A panel of ten Parliamentary election outcomes of municipalities in the 
Netherlands during the period 1981-2010 is used to calculate the sizes of the national and 
regional factors' impact in three steps. First, principal component analyses are applied to 
measure the latent variables. Second, the econometric model is estimated by Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions. Third, the responses of the election outcomes per party in reaction to 
country and regional shocks are simulated. The results indicate that regional factors have 
indeed determined election outcomes more than national factors in the period 2002-2010 in 
comparison with the period 1982-1994 for the left-wing, the middle and also the right-wing 
parties. Part of the explanation comes from regional differences in unemployment, 
demographic developments (greenness and greyness) and committed crimes.  
                                                 
1 This paper was written during my summer holidays, thanks to discussions with Dutch (seconded) colleagues in 
Brussels and in the Netherlands. All errors and omissions in this paper are mine and only mine. Research 
comments/queries are welcome at Marga.Peeters@gmail.com, Brussels (Belgium), in particular from countries 
with similar electoral outcome shifts.  
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1. Background 
 
 
Election outcomes are hard to explain. In particular at the national level, voting behaviour is 
influenced by so many different factors (economic/non-economic, political/non-political, 
personal, short/long-term policies/promises by politicians) that a straightforward explanation 
is almost never available.    
 
Peculiarly, the election outcomes in some small open economies with high living standards, 
such as Denmark, Austria and the Netherlands, have shown lately a significant shift from 
more left-wing and traditional political parties to right-wing parties. While these countries 
highly depend on international developments due to their open character and gained a large 
share of their welfare state in economic and political terms to this high degree of openness, 
there seem to be forces inside the country2 that push for (more) protection of national habits 
and traditional values. Anecdotal evidence exists that this push goes deep down at the 
regional level, towards the municipalities. 
 
This seems to be a "paradox" with on the one hand the country openness (free movement of 
goods, services, capital and persons across national borders) that has delivered the high living 
standards and on the other the voting behaviour in favour of issues relevant to the region, 
features that one could refer to as anti-globalism or even "regional protectionism". This does 
not necessarily imply a cry for less international trade in goods or services, or restrictions to 
the free movement of capital across borders, but it may refer to the movement of people in 
that there is, for example, more competition at the regional labour markets among domestic 
and foreign labourers. Moreover, the perception of bad influences from abroad can feed the 
fear for job losses and/or property losses or the feeling of insecurity and lack of safety in 
general ("unheimisch"-ness, the augmentation of physical violence). 
 
Voting behaviour at national elections will always to some extent have been influenced by 
factors that are close at the heart of the voter, emerging from the developments in the direct 
(and sometimes small) vicinity of the voter. But, in case these "regional" factors have become 
more important than national factors for a majority of voters that serve the whole nations' 
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interests, the policy makers of democracies at the national level will need to apply more 
regional approaches to solve the regional problems. The regional dimension is the core of this 
paper. 
 
To the best of my knowledge, hard evidence for the shifts in voting behaviour and regional 
factors is not yet available in the scientific literature. This study can fill this gap and seeks to 
answer the question to what extent regional factors have mattered in Parliamentary elections. 
In order to do this, an econometric model is designed explaining voting behaviour by 
unobserved factors at three different levels: the country, the provincial and the municipal 
level. This methodology is similar to the one used in the business cycle convergence studies 
(see Kose et al. (2003)). Unobserved components capture the explanatory power at different 
aggregation levels. First, these components are determined by principal components analyses 
for each aggregation level. Second, the model is estimated. Third, a simulation exercise on the 
basis of the estimated model is used to quantify the size of the explanatory power of the 
country and regional (provincial and municipal) for the observed election outcomes. 
Outcomes for different time periods are compared with each other. Thereafter, this study 
makes one step further and tries to explain the country factor and the provincial factor by 
means of economic performance indicators such as economic growth, unemployment, 
inflation, fiscal stance, demographic indicators such as greening and greying and security 
indicators such as the number of crimes and feeling of safety.  
 
The model is applied to data from the Netherlands, a country with around 17 million 
inhabitants that has 12 provinces and more than 400 municipalities. Governments are formed 
by a coalition of political parties. All Dutch nationals above the age of 18 have the right to 
vote. Citizens of other countries of the European Union residing in the Netherlands can vote 
in municipal elections, as can residents of other countries who have resided legally in the 
Netherlands for at least five years. For more information on the Netherlands electoral 
procedures, see among others Allers et al. (2009). As the Netherlands has a multitude of 
political parties and parties arise and disappear, a broad grouping of parties is made into left-, 
middle and right-wing. Nonetheless, stylized facts and estimation results for the individual 
political parties is presented in Appendix A. It is further to be stressed that this paper takes the 
point of view of the municipalities; the share of votes within a municipality for either left-
                                                                                                                                                        
2 An obvious sign in the Netherlands seemed to have been the vote against the European Constitution in 2005. 
See the analyses in the Appendix on this issue. 
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wing, or middle, or right-wing parties is being explained. Therefore, the fact that some 
municipalities are big and others are small is irrelevant in this analysis.3  
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts. Section 3 describes 
the methodology. Section 4 specifies the econometric model and factors obtained by the 
factor analyses. Section 5 illustrates the principal components and presents the estimation 
results. Section 6 summarizes, concludes, elaborates on the policy inferences and gives 
avenues for future research. 
 
 
2. Stylized facts 
 
 
During the three decades, from 1981 to 2010, ten parliamentary elections took place in the 
Netherlands: in 1981, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006 and 2010. During this 
period, 21 different political parties gained at least one seat of the available 150 seats in 
Parliament. As the spectrum of parties has been broad, parties arise and disappear, and as 
parties have at some times not been so distinct in their party programmes, three main groups 
are distinguished here: the left-wing parties, the middle parties and the right-wing parties 
(referred to here as left, middle and right).4   
                                                 
3 For example: We are not interested in the question why so many people in Amsterdam (a big municipality) 
voted for  certain political parties in the course of time, but we study the share of votes in this municipality over 
time in comparison with any other municipality (of whatever population size). 
4 Appendix A1 contains an overview of all parties elected during each election in the three decades and the 
distribution of the parties over the three main groups. 
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Graph 1  Election outcomes left, middle and right parties 1981-2010
% of total number of votes, median across municipalities
Source: Own calculations on the basis of www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl.
Election year
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Note: Each data point gives the median over all municipalities in the particular year of the number of votes for a 
party (left, middle, right and other) divided by the total number of votes. The category "other" contains the number 
of voters that did not go to the polls, the blank or wrongly filled in votes, and the votes on parties other than those 
elected for Parliament. In this category the non-votes have the biggest share. 
 
 
In the elections of 1981 the left parties gained almost 35% of the votes (see Graph 1).  In that 
year the right-wing parties obtained little less than 15%. Apart from the elections in 1998, the 
left-wing parties kept this share of votes and settled in 2010 at 30%. The right stabilized its 
share during the eighties but gained remarkably at the beginning of this century, peaked in 
2002 at more than 25% and therewith overtook the left, and accelerated further to reach 30% 
of the votes in 2010. So, in 2010, the left and right equalized. During the three decades the 
middle parties were at a steep declining trend, more than halving from its high of 40% in 1981 
to 15% in 2010. Meanwhile, the number of people that did not vote at the Parliamentary 
elections doubled in the nineties in comparison with the eighties to 20%. It peaked at 23% at 
the elections of 1998 and 2010. 
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Graph 2  Election outcomes  in the periods 
1981-94 and 1998-2010
averages across years scaled to 150 seats
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Important for our analyses is the shift in election outcomes. In order to underline this, the 
sample is split into two periods of each five elections (Graph 2). In the first period, from 1981 
to 1994 with five election years, the elections outcomes showed a victory for the middle 
parties; they obtained on average 65 seats of the 150. In the subsequent period from 1998 to 
2010 with also five election years, they lost 15 seats. As the left-wing stabilized, these seats 
went to the right-wing parties. Along with this victory of the right in the last period in 
comparison with 1981-1994, differences across regions widened. 
 
In order to analyse this widening, the distribution of the Parliamentary election outcomes 
across regions is given in Table 1, splitting the country into North-East-South-West.5 During 
these three decades even more than 40% of the municipalities in the North voted on average 
left-wing, while middle parties were most popular in the East and the South. The right was 
less popular than the left and middle in each region. Of the four regions, the West voted most 
right-wing. Keeping this in mind, the widening in differences follows from Graph 3 that 
shows the shift in election outcomes from 1981-1994 to 1998-2010 per region. 
                                                 
5 See the Appendix A2 for the division of the twelve provinces into the four regions. 
North East South West
41 31 29 29
26 35 35 29
14 16 15 18
18 18 21 23
100 100 100 100Tot al
Not e: Median of t he percent age of number of vot es per municipalit y.
Source: Own calculat ions on t he basis of www.verkiezingsuit slagen.nl.
Table 1.  Election outcomes per region and party group during 1981-2010
Left
Middle
Right
Non-vote
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Graph 3  Regional election   outcomes 
in two periods
25%
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45%
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1981-1994
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1981-1994
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The different shifts at the regional 
levels are the core of this paper. The 
South shifted most to the right. This 
move took place only at the cost of 
the middle parties. In contrast, the 
North shifted much more modestly to 
the right, mainly at the cost of the left. 
The East and West shifted each about 
5%-points to the right, mainly at the 
cost of the middle but far more in the 
East than in the West. 
 
While these four regions moved in 
the same direction from the period 
1981-1994 to 1998-2010 (more right, 
less left and far less middle), the 
figures mask significant shifts deeper 
down at the regional level. At the 
provincial level further widening is 
evident. One province did not make 
the move to the right. Among others, 
one other province moved more 
towards the left (see Table A4 in the 
Appendix for provincial details). 
 
Given the existence of significant 
differences across regions, this 
underlines the further widening 
during the major shifts during the 
first decade after the millennium. 
Hence,   there is a need for regional 
analyses to find out what factors 
drive these results.  
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3. Methodology 
 
Similar to the analyses in the literature on international economics, and international business 
cycles in particular (see Kose et al. 2003)6, we distinguish here different aggregation levels: 
country, provincial and municipal. Our endogenous variable is the election outcome of a 
particular party at the municipal level. This is explained by a country, a provincial and a 
municipal factor that we measure by three principal component analyses: one at the country 
level, one at the provincial level and one at the municipal level. In order to measure the 
municipal factor, a principal component analysis is performed on the election outcomes for 
the different party outcomes per municipality. In order to measure the provincial factor, a 
principal component analysis is performed on the election outcomes for the different party 
outcomes per province. In order to measure the country factor, a principal component analysis 
is performed on the election outcomes for the different party outcomes for the whole country. 
The calculated principal components are assumed to capture any of the elements that have 
influenced the votes for the parties per municipality, at the three different aggregation levels 
(country, province and municipality).  
 
The empirical analyses take place in several steps. First, the three principal components are 
obtained by principal components (as described above). Second, an econometric estimation 
method is used to obtain the reaction coefficients of the factors on the municipal outcomes per 
party by means of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions on a system of municipal election 
outcomes per party (see next section for the specification) for two periods: 1981-1994 and 
1998-2010. Thereafter, the estimated reaction coefficients and principal components are used 
to calculate the impact of the country principal component in comparison with the provincial 
and municipal components on the municipal election outcomes for each of the two periods.  
 
We thereafter make one step in addition to this. Keeping in mind that the principal 
components will capture many elements relevant to voting that we cannot measure, we make 
a first attempt to explain them by economic, demographic and security variables at the 
country, provincial and municipal level.   
                                                 
6 One of the similarities with Kose et al. (2003) and Kose et al. (2008) is that they also use three levels: the 
global, within country groups (emerging and developed countries) and the country level. The endogenous 
variable in their model is also at the lowest level; the country level in their case, the municipal in our case. 
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4. An econometric model with national and regional factors 
 
The econometric model explains the municipal election outcomes by the national, provincial 
and municipal factors. The factor determining the voting outcomes in municipalities at the 
country level is represented by fcountry. The factors that matter for the voting behaviour at the 
provincial and municipal level are represented by fprovince and fmunicipality, respectively. The 
model then takes the specification 
 
     yp,m,t = αp + βpcountry ftcountry + βpprovince fprovince,t province + βpmunicipality fp,m,tmunicipality  
                                 + γp yp,m,t-1 +  εp,m,t  
 
where yp,m,t is the share of votes for political party p in municipality m at time t (t= 1981, 
1982, 1986, 1989, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006 and 2010), αp a constant, and the β's and γp 
are reaction coefficients to be estimated. A lagged dependent variable is included, as 
traditional political parties tend to have a core group of loyal voters. The persistence in their 
voting behaviour is expected to be reflected in the votes for their party at the municipal level. 
In this respect it is relevant to note that the lag t-1 refers to the previous election year instead 
of the more traditional modelling of calendar years; a statistically significant and high (low) γp 
signifies that municipalities vote to a high (low) degree for the same party p from one election 
to the other. 
 
The disturbance term is represented by ε and assumed to be normally distributed, with mean 
zero and a constant variance. Due to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable which is 
assumed to account for the dynamics (in time), while the disturbance term is assumed to be 
serially uncorrelated, that is Covariance{εp,m,t εp,m,t-i}= 0  for i>1.7 
 
As we have grouped the political parties "left", "middle" and "right" in the previous section, 
subscript p refers to "left", "middle" or "right", or to the group that is called "non-vote".8 All 
votes in one municipality go to either one of these four groups. So, the econometric model is a 
system of four equations, that is subscript p=left,middle,right,non-vote and yleft,m,t + ymiddle,m,t + 
                                                 
7 This is different from other studies with similar models, see for example Kose et al. (2003), where the 
disturbance term is assumed to be a moving average process with rather long lags. 
8 This is the group that did not exercise its voting right, or voted blank or wrongly, or gave its vote to a political 
party that did not obtain a seat in Parliament. See also Graph 1. 
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yright,m,t + ynon-vote,m,t=1 for each municipality m. From this restriction follows that, in addition to 
the assumptions of the disturbance terms mentioned earlier, the assumption that disturbances 
are correlated contemporaneously across the left/middle/right/non-vote groups holds: 
Covariance{εp,m,t εq,m,t}≠ 0  for p≠q.  
 
The model used is a multinomial logit, which boils down to estimating three of the four 
equations of this system (see Baltagi, 2005). We choose to estimate the system of equations 
for the left, middle and right-groups simultaneously by Seeming Unrelated Regressions 
(SUR), to allow for contemporaneous correlation of the disturbance terms of the equations on 
the left-votes, middle and right-wing votes.  
 
Our data set is a panel where the time span is rather long, from 1981 to 2010, but with only 
ten (election) years observed. The cross-sections are rather large, from 809 municipalities in 
1981 to 430 in 2010 (see Table A2 in the appendix). As a dynamic panel is estimated only 
municipalities with three election years in a row are taken into account.9 All in all, the number 
of observations in the panel regressions remains large, and the variability of the country factor 
is high, so that consistent estimates are obtained.   
                                                 
9 Some municipalities were dropped from the data set as they contained errors; in 1981, 1986 and 1989 the 
number of votes across parties exceeded the maximum number of votes and in several other municipalities 
contained zero votes for all parties.   
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5. Estimation results 
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Graph 4  Unobserved factors at the municipal, provincial and country level
On te basis of factor analyses with the left, middle and right votes as percentage of the total number of votes per municipality
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The unobservable factors on the municipal, provincial and country level are calculated on the 
basis of the left, middle and right votes per municipality by means of principal component 
analyses. The first factors are illustrated in Graph 410, where the median across municipalities 
per country region (North, East, South and West) is shown for the municipal factor (first 
graph) and the median across provinces per country region for the provincial factor (second 
graph). Although the factor analyses do not give information on the signs, the conclusion can 
be drawn that the municipal factor is very different from the provincial and country factors. 
Moreover, differences across the country regions are significant, also for the provincial factor. 
                                                 
10 The first factor for the principal component analyses at the country level explains 65% of the variability, the 
first factor at the provincial level 57% and the first factor at the municipal level 54%. 
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Table 2.  Econometric estimation results of the election outcomes by SUR11 
 Left Middle Right Left Middle Right 
Constant 0.19 
(55.0) 
0.25 
(55.5) 
0.07 
(65.0) 
0.26 
(85.6) 
0.33 
(136.4) 
0.12 
(56.4) 
f country 0.01 
(9.7) 
0.02 
(15.0) 
-0.04 
(-55.7) 
0.01 
(10.6) 
0.002 
(3.26) 
-0.01 
(-16.2) 
f province 0.03 
(28.7) 
0.00 
(0.41) 
-0.01 
(-17.5) 
0.03 
(30.5) 
0.00 
(1.59) 
-0.03 
(-31.7) 
f municipality 0.05 
(52.4) 
-0.07 
(-60.6) 
0.005 
(15.0) 
0.06 
(62.2) 
-0.10 
(-127.3) 
0.01 
(21.8) 
yt-1 0.36 
(35.2) 
0.22 
(18.7) 
0.78 
(121.4) 
0.19 
(17.9) 
-0.01 
(-1.6) 
0.30 
(36.5) 
       
Adjusted-R2 0.88 0.93 0.92 0.86 0.95 0.83 
Sample period 1982-1994 2002-2010 
Number of obs. 8316 (=3*2772) 5493 (=3*1831) 
Note: The system of equations is estimated by Seemingly Unrelated Regressions. The 
dependent variables are the left, middle or right election outcomes divided by the total 
number of votes per municipality (in fractions). For each estimated parameter t-value are 
reported in brackets.  
 
As follows from the SUR-regressions, the computed three factors from the principal 
component analysis – country, provincial and municipality – provide highly significant 
estimates as explanatory variables for the municipal election outcomes per party. For the two 
sample periods, from 1982 to 1994 (left in Table 2) and 2002-2010 (right) only the provincial 
factor has a low t-value for the middle party regression, indicating that the provincial factor's 
effect on the middle votes in not-significantly different from zero. The country and municipal 
factors influenced the outcomes of the left, middle and right parties during both periods. 
Striking is further that the significance of the country factors declines in 2002-2010 in 
comparison with 1982-1994, for each party, while the regional factors' significance increases.  
 
Much information comes also from the estimated reaction coefficients of the lagged 
dependent variable, the so-called "loyalty" factor. In the period 1982-1994 78% of the right-
wing election outcomes can be explained by the outcomes in the previous election. This was 
36% for the left-wing parties and 22% for the middle parties. In the 15 years thereafter, 
loyalty went down significantly: to 30% and 19% for the right and left-wingers respectively. 
So, both right and left lost previous voters. The middle party lost even almost all its previous 
voters; the loyalty factor became non-significantly different from zero. However, the loss for 
the right parties was the biggest (with 48 percentage points). Estimation results for the 
individual parties are presented in Table A5 of the appendix. 
                                                 
11 The endogenous variable is censored. Neither estimation of the univariate models by Tobit, nor the outcomes 
of the system of SUR regressions after testing, show any observation out of the range of 0 to 1.  
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On the basis of these estimation results we wish to calculate the impact of the different factors 
on the municipal election outcomes in order to investigate to what extent regional factors have 
become important over time, in relation to national factors. For this purpose simulations with 
the model are carried out and presented in Graph 5.12 
 
Permanent shocks are given to the country, provincial and municipal factors of each 10% in 
comparison to the base. This implies that the country factor is simulated to be 10% higher 
than it actually was, for the whole sample period of 1981-2010. Similar shocks for the 
provincial and municipal factors are given. On the basis of these newly simulated factor 
values the election outcomes per municipality are calculated, on the basis of our econometric 
model and the reaction coefficients as presented in Table 2. These calculated election 
outcomes per municipality are presented in percentage deviations from the base. It is the size 
of the effects of the factors, as presented in the graph that is of our interest as the sign is non-
informative.  
 
As follows, for the period 1982-1994 (graphs to the left) the municipal factors mattered most 
for the left and middle party election outcomes. On the contrary, in this period the country 
factor had most effect on the right party election outcomes.  
 
For the subsequent period, that is 2002-2010, the impact of the municipal factor grew 
considerably for the left-wing and middle parties. This holds in absolute terms but also in 
comparison with the country factor, in particular for 2010. The effect of the municipal factor 
on the left-wing and middle parties' election outcomes was much higher than the effects from 
the provincial and country factors. Also for the right-wing election outcomes the order of the 
determinants' impact has changed in 2002-2010 in comparison with 1982-1994. The country 
factor, that influenced the right votes so significantly in the period 1982-1994, was completely 
overtaken by the impact of the provincial factor in 2002-2010. In 2010, a 10% increase in the 
provincial factor in comparison with the base would even have increased the share of right-
wing votes in 2002-2010 by 1 percentage point. This response is high as follows from the 
actual size (see Table 1). 
                                                 
12 In contrast to the studies of Kose et al. (2003, 2008) simulation results and not variance decompositions are 
presented in order to compare the size of the impact of the different factors on the endogenous variable. Variance 
decompositions require that the exogenous variables are orthogonal (or, alternatively, all covariances need to be 
computed). Moreover, the simulation results do not conceal the time pattern which provides us with interesting 
information here.  
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Graph 5  Responses to the party election outcomes per municipality to a 10% shock in the country, provincial and municipal factor
in % deviation from the base (medians)
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Note: The blue lines present the responses to the shock of the country factor ceteris paribus, 
and similarly, the orange (green) lines the responses to the shock in the provincial (municipal) 
factor ceteris paribus. Responses are measured in percentage points. For example, in case the 
municipal factor would have been 10% higher in comparison with the base, the median of the 
election outcomes of the middle parties (as a percentage of the total votes) per municipality in 
the period 2002-2010 would have been 1.5 percentage points lower in comparison with the 
base. 
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Table 3.  Econometric estimation results of the principal components by OLS 
 fcountry f province  
Constant -2.37 
(-48.9) 
  
GDP-growth -0.23 
(-17.3) 
-0.01 
(-1.21) 
 
Unemployment 0.77 
(60.2) 
0.91 
(60.6) 
 
Government balance 0.62 
(51.0) 
  
Consumer price inflation -0.53 
(-40.6) 
  
Green population  0.89 
(16.1) 
 
Grey population  0.24 
(10.6) 
 
Crime  -0.45 
(-26.1) 
 
12 province dummies  significant  
Adjusted-R2 0.82 0.90  
Sample period 1994-2010 1998-2006 
Number of obs. 3051 (6 years) 1987 (4 years) 
Note: GDP-growth and inflation are annual growth rates in percentages. Also the 
unemployment rate is in percentages. The government balance is in percentages of the 
nominal GDP. Green and gray population is the percentage of people in the province that 
are below the age of 21 and above 65, respectively. Crime is the number of registered crimes 
per capita in the province. Data for the explanatory variables come from the Central Bureau 
of Statistics www.cbs.nl. For the year 2010 forecasts from the Central Planning Bureau are 
used, if available. The sample periods are relatively short due to the lack of data. 
 
Part of the explanation of the country and provincial factors is found in economic, fiscal, 
demographic and security developments. This follows from Table 3 where the estimation 
results are presented of univariate regressions of the factors fcountry and f province on GDP-growth 
and unemployment at the country and provincial level, and consumer price inflation and the 
government balance at the country level. As a higher GDP-growth has a negative impact on 
the country factor, the sign of other explanatory variables is according to expectations: a 
higher unemployment rate should have positive effect on the country factor, as may have a 
higher government balance (due to the fact that this goes at the expense of the private sector). 
More difficult to interpret is the sign of inflation, unless higher (lower) inflation indicates 
higher (lower) wages and therefore higher (instead of lower) purchasing power. The size of 
the reaction coefficients and t-values indicate that unemployment is most important 
explanatory variable for the country factor.  For the province factor (right column in Table 3) 
GDP-growth is no longer significant, in contrast to the level of unemployment and the 
greenness or greyness of the population in the province. Also crime – measured here as the 
number of registered crimes per head of the province population is highly significant. 
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6. Summary, inference and policy recommendations 
 
Traditionally, the North of the Netherlands gave their vote to left-wing political parties at 
Parliamentary elections and the South and East favoured mainly middle parties. The right-
wing parties were not dominant, but the West voted most right-wing. During the period 2002-
2010 voting behaviour shifted strongly towards the right at the cost of the middle (for the 
South and East) and the left (for the North). While this shift pushed the four regions in the 
same direction from the eighties-nineties to the decade thereafter, in that each region shifted 
more to the right at the cost of either left and/or middle, differences in voting across regions 
did certainly not diminish. On the contrary, they widened at the provincial level and this 
triggered this study on national election outcomes at the provincial and even municipal level.   
 
In our analyses an econometric model explains voting for the left-, middle and right-wing 
parties at the municipal level by previous voting for the same party, and by an unobserved 
country factor, as well as unobserved provincial and municipal factors. Estimation of the 
model takes place in two steps. First, the three unobserved factors are determined by the 
principal component analyses, carried out at the three different levels (country, provincial, 
municipal). Second, the econometric model is estimated by Seeming Unrelated Regressions 
for the periods 1982-1994 and 2002-2010; the tree equations for the left, middle and right 
outcomes per municipality are explained by the three principal components (country, 
provincial, municipal) and the lagged endogenous variable.  
 
The election outcomes that we analyze for the Netherlands over three decades boils down to 
10 election years and the sample is split into two sub-periods of each 5 election years. The 
split is well-chosen in that the first sample covers the eighties and the beginning of the 
nineties when left-wing and middle parties were popular and the second sub-period from 1998 
to 2010 covers fully a big shift away from the middle and left.  
 
The econometric results indicate that country, provincial and municipal factors are highly 
significant. For each of the party groups, loyalty with the party strongly declined over time. 
Despite this loss of loyalty, or persistence, the estimation results point at a high explanatory 
value. The main reason is that the significance of the provincial and municipal factors 
increased in 2002-2010 in comparison with 1982-1994. 
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This bigger impact of the regional factors follows also from the simulation results that are 
obtained on the basis of the estimation results. In the period 2002-2010 the municipal effect is 
bigger for the left and middle parties while the provincial effect is bigger for the right. The 
regional effects are not only having a bigger impact on the election outcomes in 2002-2010 in 
comparison with 1982-1994, they also have partly overtaken the impact of the country factor. 
From preliminary analyses further follows that the provincial factor can be well-explained by 
provincial differences in economic factors such as the level of unemployment, demographic 
factors such as greening and greying, but also by security and safety measures such as the 
number of registered crimes.  
 
The outcomes of our findings are relevant to national and local policy makers. National 
election outcomes that according to our analyses are driven by regional factors, more than by 
national factors, call for differential policy approaches by (national and local) policy makers.  
 
For a small open economy, such as the Netherlands, (inter)national policies such as the free 
movement of goods, services, capital and persons across national borders have brought much 
welfare. The welfare level of the Dutch has over time been elevated in each of the Dutch 
provinces, even down to each of the Dutch municipalities (in contrast to the developments in 
many other European countries). This great value of these (inter)national policies is at risk in 
case national policy makers are elected on the basis of mainly regional instead of national 
considerations.  
 
Apart from the broad political groups, all analyses are also done for the individual parties and 
presented in the appendix. From these results it follows, among others, that some small 
middle parties have gained over the years a huge loyal core of municipalities and that these 
voters consistently voted "No" in the Referendum in 2005 for the European Constitution. 
 
For future research, the idiosyncratic factors at the municipal level need further investigation. 
A crucial determinant seems to be the perceived lack of attention from national policy makers 
at the regional level. It would further be interesting to have a cross country comparison among 
those countries that show similar shifts in election outcomes, in order to see to what extent 
regional factors gained influence in national elections outcomes. In particular, the cases of 
Denmark and Austria would be good candidates for comparison with the Dutch case.  
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Appendix   
 
 
A1. Grouping left-, middle and right-wing 
 
Although the grouping of the parties in left, middle and right is debatable for some parties, 
most people will agree with grouping the Labour Party as "left", the Christen Democratic 
Appeal "middle" and the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy as "right". As far as I 
have carried out the analyses in this study and with the different grouping experiments that I 
made, it seems most important to have these parties mentioned in the groupings due to their 
relative size. 
 
 
Table A1  Grouping of political parties 
Election 
year 
Left-wing parties Middle parties Right-wing parties 
1981 PvdA(44),D66(17),PSP(3),CPN(3),PR(3) CDA(48), SGP(3), RPF(2), GPV(1) VVD(26) 
1982 PvdA(47), D66(6), PSP(3), CPN(3), PR(2) CDA(45), SGP(3), RPF(2), GPV(1),EV(1) VVD(22), CP(1) 
1986 PvdA(52), D66(9), PPR(2), PSP(1) CDA(54), SGP(3), GPV(1), RPF(1) VVD(27) 
1989 PvdA(49), D66(12), GL(6), SP(1) CDA(54), SGP(3), GPV(2), RPF(1) VVD(22), CD(1) 
1994 PvdA(37), D66(24), GL(5), SP(2) CDA(34),AOV(7),RPF(3),SGP(2),GPV(2) VVD(31), CD(3) 
1998 PvdA(45), D66(14), GL(11), SP(5) CDA(29), RPF(3), SGP(3), GPV(2) VVD(38) 
2002 PvdA(23), GL(10), SP(9), D66(7) CDA(43), CU(4), SGP(2) LPF(26),VVD(24),LN(2) 
2003 PvdA(42), SP(9), GL(8), D66(6) CDA(44), CU(3), SGP(2) VVD(28), LPF(8) 
2006 PvdA(33), SP(25), GL(7), D66(3) CDA(41), CU(6), PvdD(2), SGP(2) VVD(22), PVV(9) 
2010 PvdA(30), SP(15), D66(10), GL(10) CDA(21), CU(5), SGP(2), PvdD(2) VVD(31), PVV(24) 
Note: 
AOV = General Elderly Alliance (Dutch: Algemeen Ouderen Verbond) 
CD = Centre Democrats (Dutch: Centrum Democraten)  
CDA = Christen Democratic Appeal (Dutch: Christen Democratisch Appèl) 
CP = Centre Party (Dutch: Centrumpartij) 
CPN = Communist Party of the Netherlands (Dutch: Communistische Partij Nederland) 
CU = ChristenUnion (Dutch: ChristenUnie) 
D66 = Democrats 1966 (Dutch: Democraten 1966)  
EV = Evangelistic People's Party (Dutch: Evangelische Volkspartij) 
GL = GreenLeft (Dutch: GroenLinks) 
GPV = Reformed Political League (Dutch: Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond) 
PvdA = Labour Party (Dutch: Partij van de Arbeid) 
PvdD = Party for the Animals (Dutch: Partij voor de Dieren) 
PVV = Party for Freedom (Dutch: Partij voor de Vrijheid) 
LPF = Pim Fortuyn List (Dutch: Lijst Pim Fortuyn) 
LN = Livable Netherlands (Dutch: Leefbaar Nederland) 
PPR = Political Party of Radicals (Dutch: Politieke Partij Radikalen) 
PSP = Pacifist Socialist Party (Dutch: Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij) 
RPF = Reformatory Political Federation (Dutch: Reformatorische Poltieke Federatie) 
SGP = Politically Reformed Party (Dutch: Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij) 
SP = Socialist Party (Dutch: Socialistische Partij) 
VVD = People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (Dutch: Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie) 
 
The figures in brackets in the table indicate the seats in Parliament that parties obtained. The 
total number of seats in Parliament is 150. 
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A2. Data 
 
Data on the election outcomes come from the official Dutch election results website: 
www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl. This databank reports per election year the votes per 
municipality per party. It provides also the total number of potential votes and the total 
number of effective votes per municipality.  
 
In order to obtain the votes per province, I summed for each province the votes across all 
cities in that particular province. The number of provinces remained the same during the 
sample period. But, many cities changed their name, e.g. due to mergers. Therefore, the 
number of cities changes over the 10 election years in the sample. For this reason, a 
considerable amount of observations got lost in the dynamic regression analyses in this paper.  
 
For the year 2010 the votes are also available per candidate and their municipality (per party) 
quoted at the election candidate list. I merged this list with the main data base of election 
outcomes by municipality. Some results with this information are listed in Table A7. 
 
For the European Constitution Referendum in 2005 votes per municipality "against/in-
favour/non-vote" are available from the same website. I merged this dataset with the election 
outcomes dataset by municipality.  
 
Only the parliamentary (Dutch: Tweede Kamer) election outcomes and the outcomes of the 
referendum for the European Constitution of 2005 are used in the analyses here. 
 
All the data on economic growth, inflation, unemployment and crime come from the Central 
Bureau of Statistics, see www.cbs.nl. 
  
Table A2  Some sample statistics 
Election year Number of municipalities Actual votes Potential votes 
1981 809 8,738,238 10,040,121 
1982 775 8,273,631 10,216,627 
1986 715 9,199,621 10,727,701 
1989 702 8,902,903 11,091,070 
1994 636 9,027,887 11,455,924 
1998 548 8,622,222 11,755,132 
2002 496 9,515,226 12,035,935 
2003 489 9,666,602 12,076,711 
2006 459 9,854,998 12,264,503 
2010 430 9,442,977 12,524,152 
Total 6059   
 
In the regional analysis the country is split in North, East, South and West. These regions 
comprise the twelve provinces of the Netherlands and are defined as: 
North: Groningen, Friesland and Drenthe; 
East: Overijssel, Gelderland and Flevoland; 
South: Limburg, Brabant and Zeeland; 
West: Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland and Utrecht. 
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A3. Summary statistics  
Table A3  Parliamentary outcomes per party per province per election year 
CDA 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2003 2006 2010 All
Brabant 0.42 0.37 0.45 0.41 0.24 0.17 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.14 0.33
 129 129 129 129 117 70 70 69 68 68 978
Drenthe 0.2 0.18 0.22 0.23 0.15 0.12 0.2 0.2 0.19 0.1 0.19
 34 34 34 34 34 12 12 12 12 12 230
Flev oland 0.32 0.3 0.38 0.32 0.2 0.16 0.27 0.29 0.27 0.13 0.24
 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 56
Friesland 0.35 0.31 0.35 0.35 0.27 0.23 0.3 0.29 0.25 0.17 0.28
 44 44 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 336
Gelderland 0.35 0.3 0.36 0.34 0.22 0.16 0.27 0.3 0.27 0.13 0.27
 93 93 86 86 86 86 71 71 56 56 784
Groningen 0.24 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.18 0.15 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.11 0.2
 50 50 50 50 25 25 25 25 25 23 348
Limburg 0.41 0.38 0.45 0.42 0.25 0.19 0.32 0.34 0.27 0.13 0.35
 106 72 72 71 58 55 48 47 47 34 610
NoordHolland 0.25 0.24 0.3 0.3 0.18 0.13 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.1 0.22
 81 81 81 81 70 70 65 65 64 60 718
Ov erijssel 0.4 0.37 0.43 0.42 0.28 0.26 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.18 0.33
 45 45 45 45 45 45 26 26 25 25 372
Utrecht 0.3 0.28 0.37 0.32 0.2 0.15 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.11 0.26
 50 50 50 39 39 37 33 33 29 29 389
Zeeland 0.27 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.17 0.13 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.13 0.24
 30 30 30 30 30 17 17 13 13 13 223
ZuidHolland 0.26 0.23 0.3 0.29 0.18 0.13 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.11 0.23
 142 142 101 100 94 94 92 91 82 73 1011
All 0.33 0.29 0.36 0.34 0.21 0.16 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.12 0.26
 808 774 715 702 635 548 496 489 458 430 6055
 
Note: Election years are given in the columns (from 1981 to 2010) and the provinces in the rows (from Brabant to Zuid-
Holland). First rows give the median across municipalities of the percentage CDA votes per total number of votes. 
The second row gives the number of municipalities. The outcomes for other nine parties are listed in the tables below. 
Only the political parties that still exist are presented here.  
 
CU 2002 2003 2006 2010 All
Brabant 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Drenthe 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02
Flev oland 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.05
Friesland 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03
Gelderland 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Groningen 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.05
Limburg 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
NoordHolland 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Ov erijssel 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03
Utrecht 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03
Zeeland 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03
ZuidHolland 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03
All 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
 
D66 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2003 2006 2010 All
Brabant 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.12 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04
Drenthe 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.05
Flev oland 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04
Friesland 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04
Gelderland 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04
Groningen 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04
Limburg 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04
NoordHolland 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.06
Ov erijssel 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04
Utrecht 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.06
Zeeland 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04
ZuidHolland 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.05
All 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.05
 
 21
Green Left 1989 1994 1998 2002 2003 2006 2010 All
Brabant 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03
Drenthe 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03
Flev oland 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
Friesland 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04
Gelderland 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
Groningen 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04
Limburg 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03
NoordHolland 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04
Ov erijssel 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
Utrecht 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04
Zeeland 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02
ZuidHolland 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03
All 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
 
PvdA 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2003 2006 2010 All
Brabant 0.16 0.17 0.22 0.21 0.16 0.21 0.09 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.17
Drenthe 0.34 0.35 0.38 0.37 0.29 0.29 0.19 0.31 0.25 0.21 0.32
Flev oland 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.15 0.17 0.09 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.16
Friesland 0.29 0.31 0.35 0.33 0.25 0.26 0.15 0.26 0.21 0.19 0.25
Gelderland 0.21 0.22 0.27 0.25 0.20 0.24 0.13 0.22 0.17 0.14 0.21
Groningen 0.33 0.35 0.40 0.37 0.27 0.28 0.18 0.31 0.25 0.21 0.30
Limburg 0.18 0.16 0.23 0.21 0.18 0.21 0.09 0.19 0.14 0.11 0.18
NoordHolland 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.17 0.20 0.11 0.20 0.15 0.14 0.18
Ov erijssel 0.20 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.19 0.22 0.11 0.20 0.15 0.12 0.19
Utrecht 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.10 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.15
Zeeland 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.17 0.21 0.11 0.19 0.14 0.13 0.20
ZuidHolland 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.10 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.16
All 0.20 0.20 0.24 0.23 0.17 0.21 0.10 0.20 0.15 0.13 0.19  
PvdD 2003 2006 2010 All
Brabant 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Drenthe 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Flev oland 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Friesland 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Gelderland 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Groningen 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Limburg 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
NoordHolland 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01
Ov erijssel 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Utrecht 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Zeeland 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01
ZuidHolland 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
All 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
 
PVV 2006 2010 All
Brabant 0.04 0.13 0.09
Drenthe 0.03 0.09 0.06
Flev oland 0.04 0.11 0.08
Friesland 0.03 0.09 0.05
Gelderland 0.04 0.10 0.06
Groningen 0.03 0.10 0.04
Limburg 0.09 0.20 0.11
NoordHolland 0.05 0.11 0.06
Ov erijssel 0.03 0.10 0.06
Utrecht 0.04 0.11 0.07
Zeeland 0.04 0.12 0.07
ZuidHolland 0.05 0.12 0.08
All 0.04 0.11 0.08
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SGP 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2003 2006 2010 All
Brabant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Drenthe 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Flev oland 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Friesland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Gelderland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Groningen 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Limburg 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NoordHolland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ov erijssel 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Utrecht 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Zeeland 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05
ZuidHolland 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
All 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 
SP 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2003 2006 2010 All
Brabant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.15 0.10 0.01
Drenthe 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.00
Flev oland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.06 0.01
Friesland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.09 0.00
Gelderland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.01
Groningen 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.08 0.00
Limburg 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.09 0.00
NoordHolland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.00
Ov erijssel 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.07 0.00
Utrecht 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.00
Zeeland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.00
ZuidHolland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.06 0.01
All 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.00
 
 
VVD 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2003 2006 2010 All
Brabant 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.17 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.16 0.13
Drenthe 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.19
Flev oland 0.15 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.21 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.18 0.16
Friesland 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.12
Gelderland 0.14 0.18 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.18 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.16 0.14
Groningen 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.11
Limburg 0.10 0.15 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.11
NoordHolland 0.21 0.26 0.21 0.17 0.22 0.25 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.22 0.21
Ov erijssel 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.15 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.12
Utrecht 0.21 0.25 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.24 0.16 0.19 0.15 0.20 0.20
Zeeland 0.15 0.19 0.16 0.12 0.16 0.17 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.15
ZuidHolland 0.18 0.23 0.19 0.15 0.21 0.23 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.19 0.18
All 0.14 0.19 0.14 0.11 0.16 0.18 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.16 0.15
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A4. The shift in provincial election outcomes 
 
Table A4.  Difference provincial election outcomes of 1998-2010 and 1981-94 
 Left Middle Right 
Drenthe -3.8 -2.6 0.1 
Flevoland -2.3 -8.9 6.4 
Friesland -2.5 -7.2 3.2 
Gelderland -1.1 -9.4 4.9 
Groningen -5.2 -6.4 2.5 
Limburg -0.3 -14.8 7.2 
Noord-Brabant 1.2 -13.4 6.3 
Noord-Holland -1.0 -7.1 5.4 
Overijssel -1.2 -10.7 3.3 
Utrecht 3.0 -8.4 3.7 
Zeeland -2.7 -6.0 2.8 
Zuid-Holland -3.6 -6.4 5.7 
Note: The names in the first column are the 12 provinces of the Netherlands.  The figures give 
the difference in the median of the left-, middle and right-wing votes per municipality in 
percentage points for  the period 1998-2010 in comparison with the period 1981-1994 (similar 
to Graph 4 for the country regions North, East, South, West). 
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A5. Econometric estimation results per political party 
Table A5.  Econometric estimation results of the election outcomes per party 
 CDA D66 GreenLeft CDA D66 GreenLeft 
Constant 0.03 
(10.6) 
0.08 
(49.2) 
-0.00 
(-0.76) 
0.19 
(41.5) 
0.01 
(26.3) 
0.00 
(7.5) 
f country 0.05 
(33.2) 
-0.00 
(-4.3) 
 -0.00 
(-2.1) 
-0.00 
(-13.1) 
-0.00 
(-24.0) 
f province -0.00 
(-0.09) 
-0.01 
(-9.4) 
0.01 
(4.06) 
0.01 
(6.4) 
-0.00 
(-7.3) 
0.001 
(3.3) 
f municipality -0.02 
(-21.7) 
0.01 
(21.7) 
0.001 
(3.22) 
-0.05 
(-40.1) 
0.01 
(28.4) 
0.00 
(20.2) 
yt-1 0.73 
(82.7) 
-0.24 
(-10.8) 
0.80 
(46.9) 
0.29 
(17.9) 
0.25 
(28.8) 
0.72 
(73.1) 
       
Adjusted-R2 0.86 0.24 0.84 0.68 0.63 0.82 
Sample period 1982-1994 2002-2010 
Number of obs. 17250  
(=6*2772+618 (GreenLeft)) 
15455 
(=7*1831+1350(CU)+867(PvdD) 
+421 (PVV)) 
 
 PvdA SGP SP VVD Pvda SGP SP VVD 
Constant 0.06 
(27.3) 
0.001 
(2.02) 
0.005 
(9.3) 
0.05 
(50.3) 
0.16 
(71.2) 
-0.00 
(-0.97) 
006 
(57.9) 
0.06 
(34.5) 
f country 0.01 
(9.8) 
0.002 
(3.46) 
0.00 
(0.61) 
-0.04 
(-69.5) 
0.00 
(2.8) 
-0.001 
(-6.13) 
0.01 
(18.6) 
0.01 
(12.9) 
f province 0.02 
(15.7) 
-0.00 
(-2.2) 
0.00 
(1.4) 
-0.01 
(-10.5) 
0.03 
(26.1) 
0.00 
(1.18) 
0.01 
(5.4) 
-0.01 
(-12.2) 
f municipality 0.01 
(19.5) 
-0.00 
(-6.7) 
0.00 
(4.6) 
0.00 
(7.5) 
0.03 
(37.6) 
-0.00 
(-4.2) 
0.00 
(6.9) 
0.01 
(18.7) 
yt-1 0.68 
(78.1) 
0.86 
(134.0) 
0.03 
(2.2) 
0.89 
(159.8) 
0.10 
(8.7) 
0.97 
(323.9) 
0.54 
(42.6) 
0.51 
(47.8) 
         
Adjusted-R2 0.85 0.89 0.01 0.94 0.63 0.99 0.48 0.57 
 
 CU PvdD PVV 
Constant 0.01 
(18.1) 
0.01 
(55.8) 
0.05 
(17.1) 
f country 0.00 
(12.1) 
0.00 
(26.5) 
 
f province 0.00 
(1.4) 
-0.00 
(-5.4) 
-0.01 
(-6.3) 
f municipality -0.00 
(-1.2) 
0.00 
(13.5) 
0.00 
(1.23) 
yt-1 0.95 
(88.6) 
0.37 
(11.5) 
1.00 (imposed) 
    
Adjusted-R2 0.89 0.56 0.69 
Note: This table contains the result of two SUR-system estimations: the first for the period 1982-1994 
including the CDA, D66, GreenLeft, PvdA, SGP, SP and VVD (in the left columns) and the second for the 
period 2002-2010 for the CDA, D66, GreenLeft, PvdA, SGP, SP, VVD, CU and PvdD.  For GreenLeft (in the 
first period) and the PVV the country factor is not included as only two years of observations are 
available (2006 and 2010) in which case the country factor is multicollineair with the constant.   
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A6. Election outcomes in relation to Referendum on the Constitution for Europe 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68 72
Vote against European Constitution in 2005
Left votes
Middle votes
Right votes
Graph A1  Left, middle and right votes parliamentary elections in 2006
in relation to the no-votes European Constitution in 2005
Source: Own calculations on the basis of www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl.
in % of the total number of votes per municipality
 
Note: A blue dot represents a municipality of which y% voted left in the Parliamentary 
elections in 2006 (read this from the y-axis) and of which x% voted "no" to the Constitution for 
Europe in 2005 (read this from the x-axis). Similarly, this holds for the green dots (middle votes) 
and for the orange dots (right votes). 
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In 2005 the Treaty for establishing a Constitution for Europe that was ratified by 18 of the 25 
EU member states, was rejected by the Dutch (and French) in a Referendum. In the 
Netherlands 62% of the votes expressed voted "no" to this Treaty and 38% voted "yes".13  
 
The Parliamentary election outcomes of 2006 relate negatively with these Referendum "no"-
outcomes as far as it concerns left- and right-wing voters, while the middle votes correlate 
positively (see Graph A1). Although the correlations are not high, they are significantly 
different from zero (-0.2 for the left with t-value -3.4, 0.2 for the middle with t-value 8.0 and -
0.1 for the right with t-value -5.4).  
 
From these results we can infer that left- and right-wing parties were in majority in favour of 
this European Treaty (or more strongly: "pro-European"); the more a municipality voted left 
or right in 2006 the less it had given a no-vote to the establishment of a Treaty for Europe in 
2005. Our conclusion from the positive slope for the middle group indicates, oppositely, that 
the more right-wing municipalities in the polls of 2006 coincided with the municipalities with 
a high majority of no-voters to the Treaty. 
 
This latter result originates from the smaller centre right parties (ChristenUnion and SGP, see 
table A6) and not the main centre right party (CDA). 
 
 
Table A6.  Correlation coefficients of the election outcomes per party with 
outcome of the Referendum on the European Constitution in 2005 
2006 "No to the Constitution" "Yes to the Constitution" Not voted 
CDA -0.21 (-4.5) 0.30 (6.7) -0.09 (-1.8) 
CU 0.65 (18.5) -0.30 (-6.6) -0.43 (-10.0) 
D66 -0.35 (-7.9) 0.56 (14.3) -0.20 (-4.3) 
Green Left -0.29 (-6.5) 0.55 (14.2) -0.26 (-5.7) 
PvdA 0.09 (1.8) -0.18 (-4.0) 0.10 (2.1) 
PvdD -0.07 (-1.5) 0.40 (-8.4) -0.31 (-6.9) 
PVV -0.13 (-2.7) -0.19 (-4.1) 0.34 (7.7) 
SGP 0.71 (21.5) 0.40 (9.3) -0.38 (-8.6) 
SP -0.31 (-7.0) -0.16 (-3.5) 0.53 (13.2) 
VVD -0.20 (-4.4) 0.64 (17.6) -0.44 (-10.6) 
2010 "No to the Constitution" "Yes to the Constitution" Not voted 
CDA -0.02 (-0.41) 0.13 (2.6) -0.11 (-2.3) 
CU 0.67 (18.5) -0.32 (-6.8) -0.42 (-9.4) 
D66 -0.46 (-10.7) 0.76 (24.1) -0.28 (-6.0) 
Green Left -0.29(-6.3) 0.58 (14.5) -0.28 (-5.9) 
PvdA -0.03 (-0.6) 0.15 (3.1) -0.12 (-2.5) 
PvdD -0.09 (-1.8) 0.28 (5.9) -0.19 (-4.0) 
PVV -0.04 (-0.9) -0.36 (-7.8) -0.42 (9.5) 
SGP 0.73 (21.7) -0.42 (-9.3) -0.38 (-8.4) 
SP -0.37 (-8.2) -0.06 (-1.3) 0.49 (11.4) 
VVD -0.22 (-4.5) 0.65 (17.6) -0.44 (-10.12) 
Note: The first panel reports the correlation coefficients of the Parliamentary election 
outcomes per municipality of 2006 with the outcomes of the Referendum on the European 
Constitution in 2005 (vote not in favour or vote in favour or not voted). The lower panel reports 
the same, but using the Parliamentary election outcomes of 2010. The values between 
brackets are t-values for the hypothesis that the correlation coefficient is equal to zero; in 
case the t-value is in absolute values higher than 1.96, this hypothesis is not accepted. 
 
                                                 
13 The no-votes on the x-axis in the graph are expressed as a percentage of the total eligible voters, instead of the 
total number of actual voters. 37% of the eligible voters did not vote.    
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A7. Election outcomes in relation to the election candidates' origin 
 
 
Table A7.  Election outcomes in 2010  
 constant candidate in the city R2-adjusted 
CDA 0.14 (51.4) -0.03 (-6.1) 0.08 
CU 0.03 (15.7) 0.00 (0.3) 0.00 
D66 0.04 (39.9) 0.01 (4.9) 0.05 
Green Left 0.05 (86.4) 0.00 (-0.0) 0.00 
PvdA 0.13 (56.0) 0.00 (0.9) 0.00 
PvdD 0.01 (60.9) 0.00 (1.3) 0.00 
PVV 0.12 (60.1) -0.01 (-1.6) 0.00 
SGP 0.02 (8.1) 0.00 (0.1) 0.00 
SP 0.08 (52.5) -0.00 (-0.6) 0.00 
VVD 0.17 (55.5) -0.00 (-0.8) 0.00 
Note: The election outcome per party (left column) per municipality of the Parliamentary 
elections of 2010 is regressed by means of OLS on a constant and a dummy that equals one 
in case there is at least one election candidate of the respective municipality at the election 
candidate list and that equals zero otherwise. The t-values are listed in brackets. The number 
of observations is 430. 
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